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Hartle and Srednicki have suggested that standard quantum theory does not favor our typicality.
Here an alternative version is proposed in which typicality is likely, Eventual Quantum Mechanics.
This version allows one to calculate normalized probabilities for alternatives obeying what I call
the Principle of Observational Discrimination, that each possible complete observation or data set
should uniquely distinguish one element from the set of alternatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hartle and Srednicki [1] use a type of probabilistic rea-
soning that includes standard quantum theory to argue
that “it is perfectly possible (and not necessarily un-
likely) for us to live in a universe in which we are not
typical.” However, this leads to their conclusion (iv):
“Cosmological models that predict that at least one in-
stance of our data exists (with probability one) some-
where in spacetime are indistinguishable no matter how
many other exact copies of these data exist.” If one were
forced to abide by that limitation, then [2] a huge vari-
ety of cosmological models giving sufficiently large uni-
verses would predict nearly unit probability for our data
set and hence the same likelihoods. Thus observations
would count for nothing in distinguishing between these
theories, and much of cosmology would cease to be an
observational science.
Hartle and Srednicki [1] note that a common kind of
reasoning in cosmology starts from an assumption that
some property of human observers is typical. They cite
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] as giving examples
of this reasoning, which they question. They point out
that this reasoning would not be valid in a version of
quantum theory in which highly atypical observations
are not highly unlikely. On the other hand, more recent
arguments against the conclusions of Hartle and Sred-
nicki have been given in [2, 14, 15, 16, 17]. For example,
Bousso, Freivogel, and Yang argue [17] that “the Hartle-
Srednicki prescription would put an end to experimental
science. It would render all experiments pointless, be-
cause we could not reject any theory until we know how
many other laboratories there are. Given the success
of the scientific method thus far, we may conclude the
Hartle-Srednicki prescription is inappropriate.”
How can we rescue science from the dire conclusions
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Hartle and Srednicki draw from standard quantum the-
ory and other similar types of probabilistic reasoning?
Here I argue that this can be done by reformulating quan-
tum theory so that it gives normalizable probabilities for
the alternatives of all possible distinct observations.
Here I shall define standard quantum theory to be any
version of quantum theory in which observably distinct
alternatives are restricted to orthogonal projection op-
erators (with the probabilities of these alternatives be-
ing given by the expectation values of the corresponding
orthogonal projection operators). Such a quantum the-
ory may be suitable for quantum states in which there
are no more than one copy of any observer (or set of
communicating observers, or civilization, or human sci-
entific information gathering and utilizing system, HSI
[1], though here I shall henceforth just say “observer” for
any of these possibilities). Then different possible ob-
servations by that observer presumably can be described
by orthogonal projection operators. However, for cos-
mological quantum states for a universe sufficiently large
that there is more than one copy of an observer that
can jointly make distinct observations, these distinct ob-
servations need not correspond to orthogonal projection
operators. Therefore, standard quantum theory is not
able to assign normalizable probabilities to such sets of
distinct alternative observations.
For example, suppose we consider the observation of
how many heads occur when two coins are tossed in a
certain recorded way. There are three possible distinct
observations for the numbers of heads that occur in one
tossing of two coins (0, 1, and 2). If only one set of two
coins is tossed (e.g., by only one observer), then these
distinct observations can be assigned orthogonal projec-
tion operators. If one has a quantum state in which it is
definitely true that exactly one set of two coins is tossed,
and each head is observed to land definitely heads or tails,
then the expectation value of each of the three projection
operators is interpreted in standard quantum theory to
be the probability for that number of heads, and these
probabilities are normalized to sum to unity.
However, if there is more than one tossing of two coins
2each (say by more than one copy of an observer), then dis-
tinct observations for the numbers of heads do not corre-
spond to orthogonal projection operators. For example,
one can have N1 heads in one of the tossings (say by one
copy of the observer) and N2 heads in a second tossing of
two coins (say by another copy of the observer), and even
if N1 6= N2, these distinct observations do not correspond
to orthogonal projection operators. In nonquantum lan-
guage, one says that these two distinct observations are
not mutually exclusive, since both can occur (one for each
copy of the observer). If one calculates the expectation
values of the projection operators corresponding to all
the distinct three observations of the number of heads in
a tossing, these expectation values will have a sum that
is greater than unity.
For example, if the coin is fair, then for one tossing of
two coins the probability of 0 heads is 1/4, of 1 head is
1/2, and of 2 heads is 1/4, which sum to unity. How-
ever, for two tossings of two coins each, the probability
is 1 − (1 − 1/4)2 = 7/16 for the existence of an observa-
tion of 0 heads, 1− (1− 1/2)2 = 3/4 for the existence of
an observation of 1 head, and 1 − (1 − 1/4)2 = 7/16 for
the existence of an observation of 0 heads, which sum to
13/8, greater than unity. That is, the expectation value
for the projection operator for at least one observation of
0 heads is 7/16, for at least one observation of 1 head is
3/4, and for at least one observation of 2 heads is 7/16.
When one has in mind a view that encompasses both
coin tossings, one says that these three possibilities for
the number of heads observed in a tossing are not mutu-
ally exclusive, since, for example, there can be both an
observation of 1 head (in one tossing by one observer)
and of 2 heads (in the other tossing by the other copy
of the observer). Therefore, the three projection opera-
tors are not orthogonal, and the sum of their expectation
values can be greater than unity.
If one had observational access to both coin tossings,
one could avoid this problem by taking a finer-grained
set of projection operators, each the product of the pro-
jection operator onto a certain number of heads for a
particular one of the tossings of two coins and of the
projection operator onto a certain number of heads for
the other one of the two tossings of two coins. Then one
would get nine projection operators, one for each ordered
pair of the number of heads for each of the two tossings.
These nine projection operators are all orthogonal, and
their expectation values will sum to unity if the quan-
tum state gives no other possibilities (e.g., possibilities
that not both coins are tossed twice or that not all coins
each fall heads or tails).
This all works well in laboratory experiments in which
one has observational access to all the relevant possibil-
ities. However, in cosmology in which there may be ex-
periments being made far away by distant copies of the
observer, for which one does not have observational ac-
cess by the copy here on earth, one cannot distinguish all
of the alternatives corresponding to a full set of orthogo-
nal projection operators. For example, in the coin-tossing
experiment in which two tossings occur, one might only
have access to the observation of the number of heads for
one tossing, and one might not even be able to distinguish
which tossing one is observing (e.g., the copies of the ob-
server making the observation might not have any distin-
guishable data). Then one cannot construct from stan-
dard quantum theory projection operators which distin-
guish the distinct observations (whether 0, 1, or 2 heads)
and which also are orthogonal. As given in the example
above, if one uses projection operators onto the set of the
three possible distinct observations, they are not orthog-
onal and can have expectation values whose sum exceeds
unity.
When the probabilistic reasoning of Hartle and Sred-
nicki is cast into the language of standard quantum the-
ory, it uses the following technique to avoid the problem
of the nonorthogonality of the set of projection opera-
tors for the distinct three observation possibilities: It
uses the actual observation of the one observer to select
the corresponding projection operator and its comple-
mentary projection operator (the identity operator minus
the projection operator onto the actual observed result).
These two projection operators certainly are orthogonal
and sum to the unit operator, so in a quantum state
which is normalized (which we shall always assume), the
sum of the expectation values of these two projection
operators is unity. However, these two orthogonal pro-
jection operators do not correspond to the results that
are observationally distinguishable to any single copy of
the observer.
For example, assume that there are two tossings of two
fair coins, but that the observer of one of the two tossings
cannot distinguish which of the two tossings he or she is
observing. (The two tossings might be observed by two
copies of a locally identical observer, very distantly sep-
arated in a huge spacetime so that the two copies cannot
communicate with each other.) Suppose that for one of
the tossings of two coins, the observer observes a total of
one head. Hartle and Srednicki make the interpretation
[1], “All we know is that there exists at least one such
region containing our data.” Therefore, they would cal-
culate the probability for the existence of one head (out
of two coins tossed per tossing) in either or both of the
tossings, which for fair coins would be 3/4. This would
be the expectation value of the projection operator onto
the existence of one head in either or both of the two toss-
ings of two coins each. The complementary probability
would be 1/4, the expectation value of the complemen-
tary projection operator onto the nonexistence of exactly
one head in either of the two tossings of two coins each.
However, this complementary projection operator can-
not be tested by a single copy of the observer, since even
if it finds that the number of heads in its tossing is not
one, it cannot know whether or not the other distant
tossing gets a result of just one head out of the two coins
tossed. Therefore, although the one copy of the observer
can confirm the existence of one head (if that is what it
observes), it cannot falsify the existence of one head (no
3matter what it observes).
On the other hand, if the observer wants a set of pro-
jection operators for which in principle it can confirm
any one of them, it could use the three projection op-
erators onto the existence of 0, 1, and 2 heads respec-
tively. However, these are not orthogonal, and for fair
coins their expectation values sum to 13/8, greater than
unity. Therefore, these three expectation values for the
three projection operators whose positive results can be
confirmed by the one observer cannot be interpreted as
normalizable probabilities.
As I see it, this apparent consequence of standard
quantum theory and of similar probabilistic reasoning
that has been beautifully deduced by Hartle and Sred-
nicki [1] seems to be a reductio ad absurdum of standard
quantum theory and similar reasoning for cosmologies in
which there are indistinguishable copies of observational
situations. However, we shall see below that replacing
standard quantum theory by Eventual Quantum Theory
can rectify the situation.
II. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF STANDARD
QUANTUM THEORY
We can generalize this discussion to the case in which
there arem distinguishable possible observations (labeled
by a subscript i that runs from 1 to m) in each of N ob-
servationally indistinguishable observational situations.
(That is, which of the N situations is being observed
cannot be distinguished by the identical copies of the ob-
server, but only the observation outcome itself.) For no-
tational purposes, suppose each observational situation
is labeled by a superscript index K that runs from 1 to
N . (We might suppose that in principle K can be de-
termined by some hypothetical super-observer, but not
by the ordinary observer confined to a particular obser-
vational situation.)
Now suppose PKi denotes the projection operator in
the entire quantum state space onto the ith observation
in the Kth situation. This would be the tensor product
of the local projection operator onto the ith observation
in the Kth local observation situation and of the local
identity operators in all the other local observation sit-
uations and in all other regions of spacetime. For fixed
situation K, the different projection operators PKi for
different values of i will be assumed to be orthogonal,
PKi P
K
j = 0 for i 6= j, because for a fixed observational
situation (fixed copy of the observer), the different pos-
sible observations are assumed to be mutually exclusive.
However, projection operators for different K’s (differ-
ent observation situations for different observers) will not
be orthogonal, even if their i’s are different: PKi P
L
j 6= 0
for K 6= L, even if i 6= j. In fact, if 〈O〉 denotes
the expectation value of the operator O, then although
〈PKi P
K
j 〉 = δij〈P
K
j 〉 when both projection operators ap-
ply to the same situationK, when they apply to different
situations K 6= L (here assumed to be in separate local
regions, with the quantum state space a tensor prod-
uct of the state spaces for each local region), one gets
〈PKi P
L
j 〉 = 〈P
K
i 〉〈P
L
j 〉, the product of the expectation
values for the individual projection operators, which need
not be zero.
Because the observer within one observational situa-
tion (one copy of the observer) cannot observe which
particular situation he or she is in and therefore has no
access to the index K that is known only to the hypo-
thetical super-observer, he or she has no justification for
using any particular projection operator PKi associated
with a particular K. However, casting the reasoning of
Hartle and Srednicki [1] into quantum language, one can
construct the projection operators Pi = I−
∏
K(I−P
K
i )
onto the existence of the observation i in at least one of
the observational situations, where I is the identity op-
erator for the full quantum state space, and where
∏
K
denotes the product over all K from 1 to N . If the ob-
server does observe i, that would confirm the truth value
of the corresponding projection operator Pi, but its com-
plement, I −Pi, cannot be confirmed by any observation
restricted to a single observational situation.
One can take pS(i) = 〈Pi〉 to be the probability in
standard quantum theory (denoted by the subscript S)
that at least one observation of i occurs, and pS(¬i) =
〈(I−Pi)〉 = 1−pS(i) to be the probability that no obser-
vation of i occurs. However, since for N ≥ 1 the different
Pi’s are not orthogonal, the sum of the pS(i)’s generically
will not be unity. One can follow Hartle and Srednicki
[1] and say that one has normalizable probabilities pS(i)
and pS(¬i) for any particular i, but one can only test
these if one uses the value of i actually observed. With
some probability the existence of i can be confirmed by an
observer within a single observational situation, but the
negation of its existence, ¬i, cannot be confirmed at all.
Because of the asymmetry between the confirmability of
i and the nonconfirmability of ¬i, it seems inappropriate
to use pS(i) as a likelihood in a Bayesian analysis.
We can also see, using an example modeled after that
in [17], quantitatively how pS(i) can be much larger than
the expectation value of PKi for any K and hence can
be highly misleading to use as a likelihood in a Bayesian
analysis. For example, take the case in which twenty
coins are tossed by each of a billion widely separated
observers (N = 109), and let the observational results
be the sequence of twenty heads and tails (m = 220 =
1 048 576 possibilities). Let i = 1 correspond to the se-
quence of all tails (0 heads in the tossing of twenty fair
coins). If one hypothesizes that all the coins are fair, the
expectation value of PK1 for anyK is 2
−20 ≈ 0.954×10−6,
less than one part in a million. However, pS(1) = 〈P1〉 =
〈I−
∏
K(I−P
K
1
)〉 = 1− (1−2−20)10
9
≈ 1−6.5×10−415.
If one used pS(1) as a likelihood in a Bayesian analysis,
one might say that its value, very near unity, would tend
to confirm the hypothesis that the coins are fair, whereas
after getting twenty tails in a row (probability less than
one in a million if there were only one tossing of twenty
fair coins), it would seem much more reasonable to inter-
4pret this as evidence against the fair-coin hypothesis.
So how can we modify standard quantum theory, which
seems to exemplify the type of reasoning used by Hartle
and Srednicki [1], to get more reasonable results, results
in which one can get likelihoods that would not nearly
all tend to unity if there were vastly many indistinguish-
able observational situations (identical copies of the ob-
server)?
III. EVENTUAL QUANTUM MECHANICS
Let me now propose a version of quantum theory in
which the probability of an observation within a particu-
lar observational situation does not depend on how many
such situations there are if the quantum state restricted
to each situation (e.g., its density matrix, after tracing
over all other regions) is the same. Since the basic el-
ements will be the events observable within an observa-
tional situation, I shall call this class of quantum theories
Eventual Quantum Mechanics, or EQM.
To motivate what I am aiming for, let me propose that
the alternatives for the observations within an observa-
tional situation should obey the following key principles
for the set of alternatives:
(1) Prior Alternatives Principle (PAP):
The set of alternatives to be assigned likelihoods by
theories Ti should be chosen prior to (or independent of)
the observation Oj to be used to test the theories.
(2) Principle of Observational Discrimination (POD):
Each possible complete observation should uniquely
distinguish one element from the set of alternatives.
(3) Normalization Principle (NP):
The sum of the likelihoods each theory assigns to all
of the alternatives in the chosen set should be unity,
∑
j
P (Oj |Ti) = 1. (3.1)
I am always assuming that the alternatives within any
set to be considered are mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive (complete). For example, if the alternatives are ob-
served data sets within some class, then each alternative
data set must be different, and all data sets within the
class must be included within that set of alternatives.
For pedagogical simplicity, assume initially that the
universe does have N observational situations that are
sufficiently indistinguishable that the observer within
each one cannot distinguish which one is his or hers. (For
example, the distinction might be only in terms of what
the surroundings are at sufficiently great distances that
the observer within the region does not have observa-
tional access to this information.) Suppose that in each
situation there are m distinguishable observations, say
given in the Kth situation by the m projection operators
PKi for i running from 1 to m (P
K
i each acting on the
entire quantum state space, but trivially as the identity
operator outside theKth observation situation). Assume
they are all orthogonal for each different i (but the same
K), PKi P
K
j = δijP
K
i , and that they sum to the iden-
tity operator I for the entire quantum state space when
summed over i,
∑
i P
K
i = I for each fixed K.
Now construct the operator Ri =
∑
K P
K
i , the sum
of the projection operators over all observational situ-
ations K but for the same observation i. Then define
the probability of the observation i in Eventual Quan-
tum Mechanics as the normalized expectation value of
this sum of projection operators,
pE(i) =
〈Ri〉∑
j〈Rj〉
=
〈
∑
K P
K
i 〉∑
j〈
∑
K P
K
j 〉
=
1
N
∑
K
〈PKi 〉. (3.2)
If one has only one observational situation, N = 1, as
has been the usual implicit assumption in traditional for-
mulations of quantum theory, then of course Ri is just
the projection operator for the observation in that one
situation, and one has the usual probability interpreta-
tion of standard quantum theory. Thus in that situation,
Eventual Quantum Mechanics reduces to ordinary stan-
dard quantum theory.
It is also easy to see that if all the N regions have
the same quantum state (e.g., the same density ma-
trix) and if the PKi ’s are all essentially the same, ex-
cept for the specification of which region it is on which
the specific PKi acts nontrivially, then 〈P
K
i 〉 is the same
for each K, and 〈Ri〉 is just N times this expectation
value. Therefore, in this case pE(i) would be the same as
〈PKi 〉/
∑
j〈P
K
j 〉 = 〈P
K
i 〉 for any K, the last equality be-
ing true because
∑
j P
K
j = I and 〈I〉 = 1 in a normalized
quantum state. Thus in the case of N identical regions,
Eventual Quantum Mechanics reduces to what ordinary
standard quantum theory would predict for a single one
of these regions. On the other hand, Eventual Quantum
Mechanics does not reduce to what standard quantum
theory predicts for many such regions, as has been nicely
shown by Hartle and Srednicki [1], because the Ri are not
projection operators that are used in standard quantum
theory to give probabilities.
Where Eventual Quantum Mechanics would allow
more general predictions than standard quantum the-
ory applied to a single observational situation would be
in cases in which the different regions (the different ob-
servational situations for different observers) have differ-
ent density matrices. Then the EQM probabilities pE(i)
would be the average of the expectation values of the
projection operators PKi over the N regions, an average
probability for the observation i in each of the N regions.
Moreover, one might further generalize Eventual
Quantum Mechanics beyond the last expression of Eq.
(3.2) to allow that the existence of each region, or the
existence of the observer within each region, might it-
self have a quantum uncertainty and hence a probability
less than unity. This could be reflected in the normaliza-
tion of the effective density matrix for each region and in
the possibility that one might define the PKj more gen-
erally so that
∑
j〈P
K
j 〉 does not necessarily equal one for
5each region. Then the fundamental operator Ri, whose
normalized expectation value gives the probability of the
observation i, might not be simply a sum of projection
operators, but perhaps a weighted sum of projection op-
erators, where the weights could effectively give the prob-
abilities of the different regions being realized, or of the
existence of the observer within each of the different re-
gions.
The weights for each region, or for the observer within
each region, need not even be existence probabilities. For
example, they might instead reflect how long each region
lasts, or how long the observer lasts within each region.
So far as I can see, the main essential feature is that
one have a positive operator Ri for each possible event
or observation (or at least an operator Ri whose expec-
tation value is positive for the actual quantum state of
the cosmos, even if it need not be positive for all possi-
ble quantum states, though it might seems simpler just
to require that each Ri be positive). It might be easiest
to understand the cases in which each operator Ri is a
sum of projection operators, or perhaps a weighted sum
of easily understandable projection operators, but I do
not see that such a requirement would be essential.
IV. MAKING EVENTUAL QUANTUM
MECHANICS MORE STANDARD
One might try to interpret Eventual Quantum Me-
chanics in a way that appears more nearly like standard
quantum theory. For example, first consider the case in
which each region, and its observer, definitely exists with
unit quantum probability. Then although the probabil-
ity pE(i) given by Eq. (3.2) cannot in general be written
as the expectation value of any natural projection oper-
ator for the problem, it could simply be written as the
expectation value of the projection operator PKi for any
particular choice of the region K if the quantum state
were independent of the labeling of the different regions.
That is, if one replaced the arbitrary density matrix ρ
for the tensor product of the N regions and for whatever
else exists outside them by the density matrix ρ¯ that is
the average of ρ over all N ! permutations of the regions,
then pE(i) is simply the expectation value of any one P
K
i
(arbitrary K) in the averaged state ρ¯:
pE(i) = tr(P
K
i ρ¯). (4.1)
However, even this conversion of pE(i) to an expecta-
tion value of a projection operator by changing the state
to an averaged state fails to be true when the quantum
probability for the existence of the observer is not unity
for each region. If in that case one calculates by Eq. (4.1)
each pE(i) and sums them over all possible observations
i, the sum will not be normalized to unity but will be
the average probability of the existence of the observer
for each region. To get a normalized set of probabilities
pE(i) in that case, one should instead in the averaged
quantum state ρ¯ take each pE(i) to be the conditional
probability for the observation i in any one of the regions
(say K), given that there is an observer in that region.
If PKO is the projection operator onto the existence of an
observer in the region K, then instead of Eq. (4.1), one
should use the conditional probability
pE(i) =
tr(PKO P
K
i P
K
O ρ¯)
tr(PKO ρ¯)
. (4.2)
One might go even further and define the observer-
conditioned density matrix
ρˆ =
PKO ρ¯P
K
O
tr(PKO ρ¯)
, (4.3)
so that then the conditional probability pE(i) can be
written as the expectation value of any one of the pro-
jection operators PKi :
pE(i) = tr(P
K
i ρˆ). (4.4)
However, being able to write pE(i) as the expectation
value of a projection operator in Eventual Quantum Me-
chanics involves replacing an arbitrary quantum state ρ
with the conditionalized averaged quantum state ρˆ. If
one wanted to stick with the original quantum state ρ, the
probability pE(i) for the observation i (normalized out of
all possible observations) cannot in general be written as
the expectation value of any natural projection operator.
V. SENSIBLE QUANTUM MECHANICS
One subclass of Eventual Quantum Mechanics theo-
ries are those of Sensible Quantum Mechanics [18, 19, 20,
23, 24, 25] or Mindless Sensationalism [26], in which the
alternative events or data sets or observations are con-
scious perceptions. Roughly, each individual conscious
perception is all that a conscious observer is aware of
or consciously experiencing at once, what Lockwood [27]
calls a “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experi-
ence” or “conscious state,” and what Bostrom [28] calls
an observer-moment. If this conscious perception is re-
garded as a observed data set, the data would be the
content of that awareness. In this set of alternatives,
each different possible conscious perception would be a
member, and any two perceptions with different contents
would be different observations.
In the case of a discrete set of conscious perceptions,
a particular Sensible Quantum Mechanics theory assigns
a probability to each conscious perception that is the
expectation value of a corresponding positive ‘awareness
operator.’ There is no requirement that these positive op-
erators be orthogonal to each other or even that they be
proportional to projection operators (though they might
be approximately proportional to the integral over all of
spacetime and over the local Lorentz group of projection
operators in local regions).
6VI. CONCLUSIONS
Whether typicality is likely depends on the way likeli-
hoods are calculated. The way likelihoods are calculated
depends on the set of alternatives to be assigned likeli-
hoods. The set of alternatives must be chosen even before
one can do a Bayesian analysis, so one cannot compare
different theories with different sets of alternatives.
Hartle and Srednicki [1] use a type of probabilistic rea-
soning that includes standard quantum theory to select
alternatives that in the quantum case are given by or-
thogonal projection operators, but their alternatives are
not distinguished by the possible observations in uni-
verses large enough to have many observational situa-
tions so similar that they are not distinguishable to the
observers within them.
On the other hand, alternatives obeying the Prior Al-
ternatives Principle and the Principle of Observational
Discrimination have normalized likelihoods in which typ-
icality is automatically favored in the likelihoods. Since
this preference comes directly from the likelihoods nor-
malized over all possible distinguishable observations or
data sets, it is not and need not be introduced “through
a suitable choice of priors” as Hartle and Srednicki [1]
suggest. Instead, the prior probabilities for theories may
be chosen to “favor theories that are simple, beautiful,
precisely formulable mathematically, economical in their
assumptions, comprehensive, unifying, explanatory, ac-
cessible to existing intuition, etc. etc.,” as Hartle and
Srednicki propose.
Cosmological theories obeying the Prior Alternatives
Principle, the Principle of Observational Discrimination,
and the Normalization Principle, but apparently not
standard quantum theory for a very large universe, can
in principle be tested by observations. It therefore seems
quite reasonable to adopt these principles. Eventual
Quantum Mechanics and its subclass of Sensible Quan-
tum Mechanics are frameworks for quantum theories
which do obey these principles and which would make
typical observations more likely. That is, they enable
typicality to be derived as likely.
Typicality by itself does not guarantee that the theory
with the highest posterior probability will make us typi-
cal. However, typicality is favored in the likelihoods. One
need not impose it separately, but in discussions in which
one does not explicitly invoke the full Bayesian frame-
work, assuming typicality may be a legitimate shortcut
for selecting between different theories for our observa-
tions. We are unlikely to be highly atypical.
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